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Abstract
The increasing volume of distributed resources and user-dependent loads in local networks has increased the concern for 
congestion and voltage management in distribution networks. To mitigate these issues, the implementation of local flexibility 
markets has been proposed to assist distribution system operators (DSOs) to manage their networks efficiently. This paper 
presents the framework of a local flexibility market, including the market participants and their roles. This framework aims 
to empower DSOs with a market-based instrument for the alleviation of congestion incidents by exploiting the flexibility of 
local resources. The proposed market aims to provide a tool for the holistic management of distribution networks by trading 
both reservation and activation of flexibility services, indifferent of the type and the timeline of the needed service. Three 
market modes are proposed, i.e., long-term, short-term and real-time market, and the interactions among those modes are 
shown. The operation of the market is explained in detail, including the identification of the needed services, the activation 
of the market as well as the proposed bidding, clearing and settlement mechanisms. The modelling of the long-term and real-
time markets is also presented, along with some indicative simulation results for long-term and real-time services. Finally, 
the future developments as well as the major conclusions are discussed.
Keywords Congestion management · Distribution network · Local flexibility markets · UNITED-GRID · Voltage 
management
1 Introduction
The need for energy transition has led to increased penetra-
tion of distributed energy resources (DERs) in distribution 
networks. The increased local electricity production has 
many advantages such as lower operational costs, reduced 
transmission losses and smaller environmental footprint, 
since it is mostly renewable-based production. However, it 
is associated with increasing operational problems in distri-
bution networks. The bi-directional power flow associated 
with the operation of DERs and the non-dispatchability of 
renewable energy sources (RES), such as solar PVs and 
wind turbines, are expected to cause congestions and volt-
age deviations in future distribution networks. This situation 
is deteriorated by the increased penetration of user-depend-
ent loads, such as electric vehicles (EVs) and heat pumps 
(HPs) [1]. Congestion generally refers to the power flow 
that exceeds the network’s transfer capacity, mostly regard-
ing line and transformer ratings, while voltage deviation is 
linked with voltage magnitudes beyond bounded limits [2]. 
Currently, the forecasted and emerging congestions in dis-
tribution networks are primarily managed by DSOs through 
grid reinforcement. DSOs conservatively increase the capac-
ity of the power lines, feeders and transformers existing in 
their networks; when a congestion or voltage problem is 
anticipated in an area, the capacity of the respective ele-
ment is passively increased to cover the predicted scenario. 
However, this approach is generally expected to result in 
increased costs for DSOs [3]. An approach to mitigate con-
gestion problems in distribution networks would be to mimic 
the methods that are traditionally used by transmission 
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system operators (TSOs) to deal with congestions that occur 
in transmission systems, such as optimal power flow-based 
methods, price area congestion methods and transaction-
based methods. However, these methods may not lead to 
effective congestion relief in distribution networks, as dis-
patching is more complex in distribution than in transmis-
sion, due to the high penetration of small-scale distributed 
generators with volatile output [4].
A more active way to manage congestion problems in 
distribution networks is by using the flexibility that is avail-
able on the end-user side. The definition of flexibility and 
its concept and utilization vary according to the perspective 
of the entity to which it is referred (power system, system 
operators, balance responsible parties (BRPs), aggregators, 
end users, etc.). From a power system perspective, the flex-
ibility of supply is defined as the ability of a power system 
to maintain continuous service in the face of rapid and large 
swings in supply [5]. From a market perspective, the flexibil-
ity of power markets is characterized by their ability to effi-
ciently cover fluctuating demand [5]. Finally, from an end-
users’ perspective, demand-side flexibility can be defined as 
the modification of generation and/or consumption patterns 
in reaction to an external signal (e.g., price signal or acti-
vation) in order to provide services to the system operator 
[6]. Therefore, it is important to consider all the different 
approaches when a framework for a flexibility exploitation 
mechanism is designed, so that the traded products can meet 
the expectations of all involved participants.
Several methods have been proposed to incentivize and uti-
lize the available flexibility that exists in distribution systems 
for congestion management, such as dynamic tariffs (e.g., time 
of use, reduced tariffs combined with use restrictions, critical 
peak pricing, etc.) [7], or grid reconfiguration. However, the 
implementation of local markets that trade flexibility from the 
end users to system operators seems to be one of the most 
promising solutions to tackle congestion problems. Local flex-
ibility markets (LFMs) can be defined as marketplaces that 
operate on geographically limited areas and in which flexibil-
ity is traded from flexibility suppliers (end users) to flexibil-
ity users (DSOs, TSOs, BRPs, etc.) [8]. It is expected that a 
marketplace with clearly defined rules and widely approved 
trading procedures will increase the awareness of all parties 
concerning flexibility use, leading to its more adequate utiliza-
tion in future energy systems. However, there are significant 
regulatory and operational issues that should be addressed so 
that the large-scale implementation of LFMs in real-life appli-
cations is feasible (e.g., existing regulations, system operator 
role, end-user participation, etc.) [9]. In recent years, there 
have been several research [10–15] and commercial [16–18] 
approaches on LFMs. These approaches differ on the scope 
(i.e., avoid costly grid reinforcement, provide robust short-term 
and real-time management of distribution networks, provide 
frequency and balancing services, etc.) and the timeline of 
flexibility exploitation (i.e., long-term, short-term or real-time 
services). Even though the exploitation of locally available 
flexibility has gained interest recently, there are not many 
approaches that directly target the alleviation of congestion 
and voltage issues in distribution level. Some LFMs proposed 
in international literature target the implementation of LFM 
as an extra tool for the formation of local energy communities 
(LECs), scheduling the operation of the LFM on top of a local 
energy market [13, 14]. Furthermore, each of the proposed 
LFMs focuses on a different operating timeline in order to 
provide different kind of services to the DSOs. For example, 
the LFM proposed in [4] focuses on the provision of long-term 
services by the flexibility providers to the DSOs in order to 
provide an alternative to costly grid reinforcement. The LFMs 
proposed in [13], and [15] focus on closer to real-time operat-
ing horizons targeting the efficient management of the distribu-
tion network and the management of imbalances, respectively. 
Therefore, it is important to conceptualize a LFM structure 
that focuses on facilitating the DSOs to manage their networks 
efficiently through the procurement of both activation and res-
ervation of flexibility in different time horizons irrespective of 
the timeline of the needed services and the nature of the antici-
pated issues. In this paper, the framework and the initial model 
of the LFM that has been developed within the H2020 project 
UNITED-GRID [19] are presented, along with some illustra-
tive results regarding the operation of the proposed structure. 
The operation of the market and the respective mechanisms 
used for opening, auctioning, clearing and settlement of the 
market are presented, while the interaction among the different 
market timelines is also explained. The proposed LFM aims to 
provide DSOs with a market-based instrument for the efficient 
management of their network, indifferent of the origin and the 
attributes of the congestion problems, as well as the different 
objectives of the participating market players. In the proposed 
LFM framework, the market players can trade both reservation 
and activation of flexibility. Based on the outcome of the mar-
ket operation, DSOs can investigate the possibility of avoiding 
grid reinforcement through the reservation of the required flex-
ibility via the long-term market structure. In addition, DSOs 
can reserve more flexibility via the short-term market (i.e., 
for the day ahead), in case that the forecasting mechanisms 
detect that more flexibility may be needed. Finally, DSOs can 
procure the necessary activation of flexibility to cater the con-
gestion incidents closer to real time, while exploiting the flex-
ibility capacity that has been reserved by the long-term market. 
Hence, the main novelty of the proposed LFM framework is 
the envision of the different market modes and the interaction 
among them to facilitate the reservation and activation of flex-
ibility. This way, the proposed LFM provides a market-based 
instrument to the DSOs to avoid the grid reinforcement cost 
in the long term, while ensuring the secure operation of the 
distribution system closer to real time. The main contributions 
of this paper are:
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• The development of a LFM framework that can miti-
gate congestion issues in different time horizons. In the 
proposed market framework, both reservation and acti-
vation of flexibility can be traded. More specifically, in 
the proposed LFM framework, a long-term market mode 
is envisioned that will trade the reservation of flexibil-
ity for the coming months or years to avoid grid rein-
forcement, while providing the rules for the activation 
of the reserved flexibility closer to the event, if neces-
sary. Furthermore, a short-term market mode is proposed 
for the day-ahead management of distribution networks 
that will also trade reservation and possible activation 
of flexibility services. Finally, a real-time market mode 
is proposed that will trade the activation of flexibility to 
alleviate real-time congestions and emergency problems. 
This novel approach provides the DSOs with the neces-
sary market-based tools to mitigate congestion incidents 
and effectively manage their networks in different time 
horizons;
• The detailed explanation of the different stages of the 
market operation (i.e., opening, auctioning, clearing and 
settlement of the market) for the different market modes;
• The provision of the initial models of the long-term and 
real-time market modes of the proposed LFM frame-
work, along with the initial simulation results that indi-
cate the feasibility of the proposed framework to result 
in flexibility exploitation and in mitigation of congestion 
incidents in distribution networks. For the construction 
of the real-time flexibility supply bids, data from smart 
buildings with different assets (i.e., solar PVs, batteries, 
HPs) located on the premises of Chalmers University of 
Technology in Gothenburg, Sweden have been used.
The remaining of this paper is as follows: In Sect. 2, the 
proposed market framework is presented, including the mar-
ket participants and their roles as well as the proposed mar-
ket timelines along with their objectives and interaction. In 
Sect. 3, the operation of the proposed market is explained, 
while in Sect. 4 the modelling of the different market modes 
is presented. In Sect. 5, the initial simulation results of the 
proposed market framework are included. Finally, in Sect. 6 
the major conclusion of this work as well as the envisioned 
future developments of the proposed LFM are discussed.
2  Proposed LFM framework
In this section, the LFM framework is presented. The par-
ticipants of the market and their roles are explained, while 
the different timelines and the interaction among them are 
illustrated. The proposed LFM is event driven; when a 
congestion incident emerges, or when it is forecasted, the 
suitable market mode is activated. Therefore, the proposed 
market model should be coupled with a mechanism that can 
forecast congestions in different horizons. Hence, the market 
model should be designed to mitigate as much as possible 
the inherent inaccuracy of the forecasting tools, especially 
in the longer time horizons.
2.1  Motivation
Due to the increasing penetration of RES and unpredictable 
loads in distribution grids, more congestion and voltage-
related issues appear with an incremental frequency and 
severity. Therefore, DSOs should be prepared for this future 
challenge, as their tasks are evolving from long-term plan-
ning to including also short-term and real-time grid opera-
tion [12]. For this reason, within the UNITED-GRID pro-
ject, the framework of a LFM has been developed, targeting 
the efficient employment of demand-side flexibility through 
a dedicated marketplace, which will provide DSOs with suit-
able mechanisms to alleviate these phenomena.
2.2  Market participants
In the proposed LFM framework, the following entities can 
participate:
a) The local DSO which is responsible for identifying the 
need for flexibility services as well as for passing the 
signal for the activation of the market along with the 
request for the necessary service to the market operator. 
The flexibility provided by the flexibility suppliers will 
be a modification in active or reactive power consump-
tion or generation. The procured flexibility could be 
used to alleviate different issues, e.g., voltage limit vio-
lations, overloading of components or to reduce peaks/
losses.
b) The LFM Operator (LFMO) The LFMO is the entity that 
manages the operation of the most important aspects of 
the LFM, such as bidding, clearing and settlement of the 
market. The LFMO could be the DSO, a DSO-oriented 
entity or an independent entity, according to the exist-
ing regulatory framework. In the economics literature, 
it is often suggested that the market operator should be 
an independent, neutral third party. More specifically, 
Eurpex directly recommends that the LFMs should be 
operated by independent third parties, who are not them-
selves active on the market, in order to avoid any risk of 
conflict of interest and ensure non-discriminatory access 
for all market participants [20]. Therefore, the LFMO 
should not be an aggregator that participates in the LFM. 
This would imply that this aggregator would have had 
an unfair advantage comparing to other aggregators par-
ticipating in the same LFM. The LFMO is important for 
the efficient management and it could only be omitted 
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in case that the DSO directly manages the market. In 
the proposed framework, the LFMO is responsible for: 
i) activation of the market; ii) conducting the auctions 
(broadcast DSO’s request for flexibility and gather the 
bids from the interested suppliers); iii) clearing of the 
market; iv) contracts between the DSO and the winning 
bidders; and v) settlement.
c) Aggregators representing: i) prosumers; ii) households 
with flexible loads; iii) EVs; iv) building and storage 
owners; and v) local DER owners. The aggregators are 
responsible for gathering and managing their portfolios’ 
flexibility, as well as for representing them in the LFM 
by bidding in response to the requests of the DSO. The 
participating aggregators should have good understand-
ing of the local market mechanisms as well as the ability 
to adequately determine the price of the flexibility ser-
vices that will be provided by their associated resources. 
Finally, they are also responsible for representing their 
portfolio in the settlement phase of the market; they will 
be paid by the DSO through the LFMO for the provided 
services, and then, they will be responsible to allocate 
these financial benefits among their resources according 
to their participation in the respective service.
2.2.1  Market timelines
In the proposed LFM, three different modes regarding tim-
ing are proposed, so that the DSO is equipped with a tool 
to mitigate congestions in different time resolutions. The 
different market modes and their most significant charac-
teristics are:
a) Long-term market This market mode is responsible for 
services forecasted long time in advance and needed for 
a specific period (e.g., the next year, a specific month, 
etc.). In this mode, the reservation of flexibility is traded 
so that the DSO can procure the adequate capacity of 
flexibility in areas with anticipated problems, while pay-
ing a reservation fee. Services can be activated, when 
needed, closer to real time. Then, the DSO will pay an 
activation fee. A maximum price cap for the activation 
fee could be agreed on the long-term market, while the 
actual fee will be determined in the real-time market. In 
the long-term market, the possibility of multiple activa-
tions within the specified period is included. This market 
is open from when a need for a long-term service is fore-
casted until a certain time (e.g., one or several months 
depending on the traded service and the risk assess-
ment of the DSO) before the date of the first possible 
activation. Closer to the delivery time, the DSO could 
activate the reserved flexibility by sending a request 
to the cleared aggregators that the reserved flexibility 
should be available in the real-time market, with, e.g., 
the predefined maximum price cap. By including both 
the reservation and activation price in the long-term 
market, the DSO knows what the maximum cost for the 
requested flexibility needed to solve potential conges-
tions would be. This market mode provides an alter-
native to grid reinforcement, while long-term contracts 
would encourage customer participation, hence enhanc-
ing market liquidity. The details about the proposed 
long-term market operation can be found in Sect. 3.
b) Short-term market This market mode is responsible for 
services forecasted for the following day that cannot be 
catered by long-term contracts, due to forecasting errors 
related to the anticipated inaccuracy of the used con-
gestion forecasting mechanisms on the long term, the 
possible underestimation of the potential congestion by 
the DSOs or the emerge of a congestion issue that has 
not been previously predicted (e.g., transformer main-
tenance, larger EV penetration or larger PV production 
than anticipated, etc.). The short-term market is open for 
specific hours of the previous day (e.g., until 12:00 of 
the previous day), where the DSO can procure flexibility 
reservation for the next day. In the short-term market, 
both reservation and activation of aggregators’ flexibility 
will be traded in a similar way to the long-term market.
c) Real-time market This market mode is responsible for 
the activation of the services for the following time 
period (e.g., 1 h), including the activation of the capacity 
reserved in the long-term or short-term market modes as 
well as the flexibility that is required to cater emergen-
cies that have not been forecasted and cannot be catered 
by the reserved capacity. The time resolution of this 
market mode is 15 min. After the respective real-time 
market is cleared, the DSO can either take direct con-
trol of the resources, or utilize the accepted resources 
according to its needs for the next time step (15 min) 
by submitting dispatch signals to the respective aggre-
gators, which will then be responsible to follow that 
schedule and define which resources of their portfolio 
will provide the required service. Since in real-time grid 
reinforcement is not an option, DSOs provide a price 
curve for the respective service, while the aggregators 
provide their price curves regarding the flexibility that 
they can offer in response to the DSOs request. Thus, 
in the real-time market the DSO is willing to pay more 
to activate as much flexibility as possible to cater the 
emerging incident. The interaction among different mar-
ket modes is shown in Fig. 1.
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3  Proposed market operation: 
how the market works
The proposed LFM is event driven according to the traffic 
light concept [7, 21]. It is assumed that the DSO constantly 
forecasts its future state through a congestion forecast-
ing mechanism, and when a problem is detected (amber 
phase), it sends a signal to the LFMO for the activation of 
the market. When no problem is detected (green phase), 
the market is idle. In emergency cases, and when no solu-
tion can be provided by the operation of the market (red 
phase), the DSO takes direct control of the resources to 
manage its network. When a service need is forecasted, the 
DSO sends a signal to the LFMO that activates the suit-
able market mode (i.e., long term, short term or real time). 
Then, the LFMO is responsible for the required auction. 
The request of the DSO is published in open orderbooks 
accessible to all aggregators participating in the respective 
area, where the interested aggregators can place their bids. 
The request of the DSO should include information about 
the type, location, volume, duration and pricing of the 
service. The bidding and clearing procedures are slightly 
different in the different market modes. However, the bind-
ing characteristic is that in all situations the DSO is the 
only buyer of flexibility while the bidding aggregators are 
multiple flexibility providers. Therefore, in the proposed 
market framework no TSO-DSO coordination schemes are 
studied or proposed. However, although the TSO is not 
directly included in the LFM, aggregators can still decide 
if they want to participate in the LFM or in the respective 
TSO ancillary services market. Hence, the price in the 
LFM would partially reflect the anticipated TSO ancillary 
service prices. Future expansion of the LFM could include 
the possibility of multiple flexibility buyers on the demand 
side (e.g., TSO, BRPs, other aggregators, etc.). After the 
auctions, the feasibility of the selected bids should be veri-
fied. For example, the selected bids could be fed back to 
the used congestion forecasting mechanism, so that the 
possibility of future congestion or voltage problems ought 
to their employment can be checked. The general operation 
of the market is illustrated in Fig. 2.
3.1  Required service identification
The identification of the needed service is derived by a con-
gestion forecasting mechanism linked to the DSO operation. 
The output of such a tool can be used for the identification 
of the DSO need for flexibility concerning the following 
parameters:
• Probability of a specific incident to happen;
• Estimated type of the forecasted incident (i.e., conges-
tion, voltage issue);
• Estimated severity of the incident (i.e., x kW, y V, etc.);
• Estimated location of the incident;
• The element of the network that the incident is antici-
pated (i.e., line, transformer, node);
• Estimated timeline of the incident (i.e., long term, short 
term, real time);
• Estimated time and duration of the incident;
• Accuracy of the forecast. Generally, the longer the fore-
cast window is, the lower the accuracy will be, as the 
generation and load forecast required for the congestion 
forecast are not highly accurate in the long term. For this 
reason, in the proposed LFM framework, the long-term 
market mode trades the reservation of flexibility and not 
its activation. In this way, the DSO can ensure that the 
required amount of flexibility has been reserved in the 
long-term market, while the short-term and the real-time 
Fig. 1  Overview of the different modes of the LFM and their interaction
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market modes are available to correct potential underesti-
mation of the future conditions by the congestion forecast 
mechanism. In this way, the unavoidable forecast inac-
curacy is mitigated. It is considered that the accuracy of 
the congestion forecast mechanism in real-time or close 
to real-time events is satisfyingly high.
Then, the DSO can assess the output of the forecasting 
mechanism and decide whether to initiate the procedure for 
the activation of the market or not. This decision should be 
based on the probability of the incident to happen as well 
as its anticipated severity. However, the final decision of the 
type and the requested volume of flexibility will be a func-
tion of several other parameters, such as the risk level of the 
DSO, the market participants that are operational on the area 
of the incident, the anticipated cost for the DSO etc.
3.2  DSO service request and market activation
After the identification of the need for service, the DSO 
passes the activation signal to the LFMO that in the next 
step will be responsible for broadcasting the service request 
to all participating aggregators by opening a specific order-
book. Before that, the DSO should evaluate the forecasted 
situation and decide on the volume of the required flexibil-
ity, the location in which the flexibility is needed, as well 
as the duration and the maximum price of the service. It is 
noted that the details of the operation of the short-term mar-
ket mode, as well as the respective model and simulations 
tests, will be studied in future expansions of the proposed 
LFM. In the real-time market mode, the DSO provides a 
price curve, while the reservation of flexibility is not traded. 
The maximum allowable activation price of the long-term 
services will serve as the maximum cap for the activation 
of the reserved capacity closer to the incident, if necessary, 
through the real-time market. The market activation signal 
should include information about the service type (e.g., 
congestion relief), service timeline (e.g., long-term), price 
(i.e., activation and/or reservation fees), location (e.g., area 
and element), duration and other specifications such as the 
maximum times of activation and the possible activation 
window. A typical template regarding the DSO request that 
can be delivered to LFMO is shown in Table 1, while an 
example of a real-time service request that the DSO passes 
to the LFMO is presented in Table 2.
It should be noted that the volume of the DSO requests 
could generally be different from the forecasted conges-
tion volume. The reasons behind that could be the different 
risk level of the DSO, the possible flexibility that has been 
already reserved as well as the accuracy and the possibil-
ity that has been predicted by the congestion forecasting 
mechanism. An example of a long-term service request from 
the DSO is presented in Table 3. It is assumed that the con-
gestion forecasting mechanism has provided a forecast for 
a long-term service need (i.e., the whole August) at an area 
of the distribution grid (i.e., an overload of a transformer) 
due to the expected increased penetration of RES and/or 
EVs in the coming period. In such a case, the provided 
Fig. 2  General overview of the proposed LFM operation
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service request from the DSO to the LFMO will be shown 
in Table 3. In that case, the clearing will be performed con-
sidering both reservation and activation prices of the aggre-
gators bids, while also considering the maximum activation 
and reservation prices defined by the DSO (i.e., 1.5 €/kWh 
and 10 €/kWh, respectively). More information about the 
clearing of the long-term market is cited in Sect. 3.5.
From the comparison of the real-time and long-term 
service request, it is evident that there are some substan-
tial differences between the different market modes espe-
cially regarding the pricing and the activation/reservation 
procedure. However, the general idea remains the same, as 
the DSO must identify, assess and publish its need to the 
market operator, which is then responsible to broadcast the 
requests to the interested aggregators through the opening 
of the respective orderbook.
3.3  Service orderbook opening
After receiving the signal from the DSO, the LFMO acti-
vates the respective market mode by notifying every partici-
pating aggregator in the area of interest about the specific 
request of the DSO. The LFMO opens a new orderbook in 
which the DSO service request is placed. This orderbook 
should be broadcasted through a dedicated template that 
will clearly communicate the needed flexibility service, so 
that every participant understands the basic points of the 
request. A typical suggested orderbook template is presented 
in Table 4.
Comparing the request that the LFMO receives and the 
published orderbook the main differences are:
• There is no specification regarding the type of issue in 
the DSO network (i.e., overload, overvoltage, etc.);
• The requested volume of flexibility is not disclosed to the 
aggregators;
• The maximum price that the DSO is willing to pay for 
the required service is not provided to the aggregators;
• The time instant of the orderbook opening as well as the 
time of the market closure are broadcasted to the aggre-
gators.
The first three alterations aim to protect the DSO as well 
as the LFM from malicious events such as market power 
incidents. Even though the phenomenon of market manipu-
lation is not particularly studied in the current work, it is 
assumed that considering some sensitive information of the 
DSO as confidential until the clearing of the market (i.e., 
the type of issue in the DSO network, the volume of flex-
ibility requested by the DSO, and the DSO pricing of the 
event) is the first step towards reducing the risk of gaming 
and malicious behavior of the market players. Furthermore, 
Table 1  Example of the service request template that the DSO should provide to LFMO























i.e., the time of the 
estimated incident 






i.e., the latest date 
and time for eligi-
ble bids
Table 2  Example of real-time service request













Table 3  Example of long-term service request

















it can generally be assumed that the possibility of mar-
ket manipulation decreases when the number of the par-
ticipants increases. The number of the participants that is 
required to avoid market power incidents will be the scope 
of future work. In addition, the implementation of the LFM 
in a larger geographical area might help towards increasing 
its liquidity. Having a higher liquidity can help having a 
more diverse set of prices offered by the flexibility provid-
ers, hence mitigating malicious and gaming opportunities. 
Moreover, it is important that the market design is incen-
tive compatible (i.e., participants bid with their true cost). 
This can be achieved in liquid markets or through the Vick-
ery–Clark–Groves method [22–24] for settlement of the 
market which will be the scope of future work. Furthermore, 
curve-bidding (multiple-bidding) in the real-time market 
mode can help including the preferences of the participants 
and reducing the chance of such situations. Nevertheless, 
a complete and functional market should have carefully 
defined rules that incentivize all participants to bid accord-
ing to their actual cost and benefits in the market; the market 
should be designed in a way that the participants will not 
gain any benefit by falsely bidding in the market. The defini-
tion of the methods to achieve that in the proposed LFM will 
be the scope of future work. The latter difference is imposed 
to increase the transparency of the market. An illustrative 
orderbook opening that broadcasts the DSO request to the 
aggregators regarding the long-term example presented in 
Table 3 is shown in Table 5.
3.4  Aggregators bids
After the DSO request has been broadcasted to all aggrega-
tors, the interested aggregators are able to submit their bids 
in response to that request. For transparency reasons, all 
bids should be stored in the dedicated orderbook, along with 
all their necessary information (volume, price, time of sub-
mission, location, etc.). The individual aggregator bids will 
not be disclosed to the other aggregators for confidentiality 
reasons. A uniform template can be used for the aggregator 
bids as presented in Table 6.
All aggregator bids referring to a specific DSO request 
ID are stored in the respective orderbook by the market 
operator. When the market is closed, the market operator is 
responsible for evaluating the bids and proceed to the market 
clearing. It is noted that in the real-time market the aggrega-
tors should submit only their activation prices.
Let’s assume that for the long-term example illustrated in 
Table 5, there are three interested aggregators that offer their 
Table 4  Example of orderbook template
DSO Request ID (this would be an ID for reference purposes)
Service type Timeline Loca-
tion













e.g., the nodes 
of interest
i.e., active or 
reactive power






i.e., the latest date and 
time for eligible bids
Table 5  Example of long-term orderbook opening
DSO Request LT20200313_153340
Service type Timeline Location Nodes Flexibility type Time and duration Timestamp Market closure







Table 6  Template for aggregator bids
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activation price








flexibility. Then, the respective orderbook at the time instant 
of the market closure would be similar to the one presented in 
Table 7. Note that for the long-term services, the aggregators 
should bid both their activation and the reservation prices.
After the deadline of the market closure, the LFMO is 
responsible for the assessment of the bids and the clearing 
of the market.
3.5  Auctions and market clearing
The general approach of the market clearing is based on 
the fact that the DSO is the only flexibility buyer. However, 
there are some differences between the long term and the 
real time derived by the inherent differences of the DSO 
needs in the different time horizons. In the long term, the 
DSO tries to investigate the available amount of flexibility 
in the location of interest, so that the necessity of grid rein-
forcement can be evaluated, while in the real time the DSO 
is willing to get as much flexibility as possible up to the 
amount that it is still valuable for it in order to address the 
upcoming incident and maintain the stability of the system. 
Generally, when the market closes, the LFMO goes through 
the specific orderbook and checks the eligibility of the bids 
(e.g., if the bids are applicable in the area of interest, if all 
the fields have been adequately filled, etc.). Afterwards, the 
LFMO places the bids in ascending order from the cheapest 
to the most expensive. The distinction between the long-term 
and the real-time market in terms of clearing can be mostly 
defined in the following parameters:
• In the long-term market, both activation and reservation 
costs should be considered, while in the real-time market 
there is only the cost related to the service activation. 
Thus, a way should be defined so that both activation 
and reservation prices are incorporated into the clearing 
mechanism. In the developed framework, the clearing 
of the long-term market is based on a single price. The 
DSO should define some weighting factors to the LFMO 
regarding the activation and the reservation price of the 
bids. Then a single price is calculated according to which 
the single-sided auction is performed:
where pR
i
 is the reservation price of the ith aggregator, 
pA
i
 is the activation price of the ith aggregator, pAgg
i
 is the 
weighted price of the ith aggregator and a , b are the res-
ervation and activation weighting factors, respectively. For 
example, let’s assume that a = 0.8 and b = 0.2 and that an 
aggregator bids with 10 €/kWh as activation price and 1 €/
kWh as reservation price; hence, the weighted price for this 
aggregator will be 0.8*1 + 0.2*10 = 2.8 €/kWh. Despite that 
the market can be cleared by using the weighted price for 
each aggregator, there is still the need to conclude on the res-
ervation price and the maximum allowable activation price. 
In the proposed framework, a pay as bid approach is followed 
for the reservation price of the long-term services; the win-
ning aggregators are reimbursed according to their submit-
ted reservation prices. Furthermore, the submitted activation 
price of the winning aggregators is stored and used as an 
input for the real-time market, if the activation of the reserved 
flexibility is needed. In that case, the submitted activation 
price in the long term will serve as the maximum cap for the 
aggregators in the real-time market; the aggregators that have 
been cleared in the long-term market should bid in the real-
time market for the activation of the reserved flexibility at a 
price equal or lower than the activation price that they have 
submitted in the long-term market. The aggregators that have 
won in the long-term market (meaning that their flexibility 
has been reserved for the possible future congestion incident) 






, s.t. a + b = 1
Table 7  Example of long-term orderbook at the time of market closing
DSO Request LT20200313_153340
Service type Time-line Location Nodes Flexibility type Time and duration Timestamp Market closure















LT20200313_153340 Aggregator 3 Area 4
Node 3
20 12 0.5 2020/04/02
11:42:19
LT20200313_153340 Aggregator 2 Area 4
Node 3
15 8 0.9 2020/05/20
18:08:34
LT20200313_153340 Aggregator 4 Area 4
Node 4




if it is necessary. If they do not bid in the real-time market or 
if the volume they bid is lower than the volume that has been 
reserved in the long-term market, a penalty will be imposed 
in the settlement phase. In this way the uncertainty regard-
ing the availability of flexibility in the real time is mitigated.
• In the long-term market, there is no elasticity on the 
demand side (i.e., the DSO) as the DSO should deter-
mine whether the available flexibility capacity is ade-
quate to securely manage the system in the long-term 
or reinforce it. Therefore, from the DSO side only the 
maximum allowable price and the required volume is 
necessary, and a single-sided auction can be performed, 
similarly to [4]. On the contrary, for real-time events 
the DSO is willing to pay more to buy the necessary 
flexibility up to the point that the congestion can be 
mitigated. Therefore, the DSO provides a demand 
curve to the market operator. In addition, the aggre-
gators bid similar curves, which represent their avail-
able flexibility. The market is then cleared based on the 
intersection point of those curves.
• The real-time market is cleared with a 15-min resolu-
tion. If a real-time event is larger than 15 min, the DSO 
should activate the market multiple times to address the 
event. In the current market model, it is assumed that the 
DSO puts suitable requests resulting in optimal flexibility 
exchange for both the demand and the supply side.
The selected bids should be sent back to a congestion 
forecast mechanism to check the probability of causing other 
congestion incidents derived by their employment. After 
the feasibility check, the market is cleared, and the winning 
aggregators are informed. The winning bids are then written 
in the specific orderbook along with the cleared activation 
and/or reservation price, depending on the market mode, for 
transparency reasons. For confidentiality reasons, the order-
book should not be publicly accessible until the end of the 
service provision, so that possible malicious actions from 
competitors are avoided. In addition, after the settlement 
phase, details about the aggregators that bided to the specific 
DSO request will not be revealed. Nevertheless, the clear-
ing status of the specific DSO request (cleared/not cleared), 
the cleared volume as well as the cleared reservation and/
or activation prices of each aggregator along with the pos-
sible penalties of undelivered activation should be included 
in the published orderbook. Table 8 presents an example of 
a typical orderbook containing the information related to 
market clearing, while Table 9 presents a possible specific 
Table 8  Typical orderbook example regarding market clearing information
Market clearing
Status Cleared volume (kW/kVar) Timestamp
i.e., Cleared/not cleared i.e., the cleared volume in kW or kVar i.e., market clearing timestamp
Table 9  Typical example of a closed orderbook for a long-term service request
DSO Request LT20200313_153340
Service type Time-line Location Nodes Flexibility type Time and duration Timestamp Market closure
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Node 3












Aggregator 4 Area 4
Node 4
30 7 1.1 2020/06/27
08:27:56
Market clearing





closed orderbook based on the market example presented 
in Table 7.
3.6  Market settlement
After the finalization of the service provision, the neces-
sary settlement of the service is implemented, for which the 
LFMO is responsible. The settlement phase of the market 
and the related penalties for possible non-deliveries or deliv-
eries of lower volume of flexibility mitigate the uncertainty 
about the responsiveness of the aggregators; the aggregators 
are aware that since they participate in the market they are 
obliged to deliver the cleared volume of flexibility, otherwise 
they must pay the respective penalty which is determined by 
the market rules. Therefore, the reliability of the proposed 
LFM framework increases; the DSOs can consider that the 
agreed flexibility will be available when they need it, accord-
ing to the clearing of the market. The settlement is similar 
for all market modes and it should combine both reservation 
and activation reimbursement, where applicable. Since a pay 
as bid approach is followed for the flexibility reservation, the 
settlement will be customized for each aggregator according 
to their submitted reservation and their cleared activation 
price. For the long-term and short-term market, the part of 
the reservation settlement will be decided according to the 
respective auction and it will be calculated by:
where cres
i
 is the reservation settlement price for the ith 
aggregator, pRi is the submitted reservation price of the 
ith aggregator and Pres
i
 is the reserved volume of the ith 
aggregator.
The activation settlement should consider the actual acti-
vation of resources’ flexibility, e.g., the deviation of their 
operation from a predefined schedule. Since the activation 
is decided closer to real time, the settlement of the activa-
tion should be done according to a schedule of aggregator’s 
portfolio that should be submitted to the DSO the previous 
day (e.g., 12:00 the day before the service). This should be 
the procedure for all aggregators that are willing to partici-
pate in the short-term and real-time market modes, even if 
the respective incident has not been auctioned yet, e.g., to 
be able to participate in the real-time market, a schedule 
of the planned resources must be submitted. In addition, 
all aggregators that have been cleared in long-term services 
that may be activated through the real-time market, should 
also submit this baseline schedule. Then, the activation set-
tlement should be assessed based on the scheduled baseline 
and the deviations from that for service provision purposes. 
This approach implies that adequate measurement devices 
are installed on the resources, so that their power profile is 




volume (i.e., deviation from the baseline) is different from 
the one cleared, the aggregator will have to pay a prede-




 is the activation settlement price for the ith aggre-
gator, pA is the activation price of the real-time market, ppen 
is the penalty price, Pcleared
i
 is the flexibility volume of the 
ith aggregator that has been cleared in the real-time mar-
ket and Pmeas
i
 is the measured flexibility provided by the ith 
aggregator.
Thus, the total settlement price in which the ith aggrega-
tor will be reimbursed for its service would be given by:
4  Market modelling
In this section the modelling of the proposed LFM is pre-
sented. Two different market modes have been designed: i) 
long-term; and ii) real-time market. The modelling of the 
short-term market mode will be the scope of future work.
4.1  Long‑term market
For the long-term market, both reservation and activation 
prices have been considered. The market clearing is per-
formed based on the weighted price of the activation and 
reservation prices of the aggregators’ bids according to (1).
To explain the mathematical formulation of the market 
clearing, the location and time-related attributes of the bids 
are excluded, as they are not involved in the mathematical 
calculations of the market clearing. In other words, the clear-
ing is explained for a specific time window and a location, 
and this formulation is applicable in the clearing of each 
bid set with similar location and time window. Excluding 
the abovementioned attributes, the supply bids ( Bs ) and the 
demand bids ( Bd ) consist of a reservation price ( R ), an acti-
vation price ( A) and a quantity ( q ). Since the market is a 
single-sided auction, the bids on the demand side consist of 
only one set (Eq. (5)) while the supply side consists of a set 



































From the reservation and activation price, a total price is 
formed according to (7).
The market is solved by maximizing the social welfare 
which is the consumers’ benefit minus the sum of the value 
for the cleared supply bids (i.e., suppliers’ cost) (Eq. (8)). It 
should be noted that practically in such LFM structure, a trade-
off between the benefits of all stakeholders (i.e., the DSOs and 
the aggregators) should be considered. However, the proposed 
LFM has been built as closely as possible to strict market terms. 
In addition, the optimization of the social welfare implies that 
there is a trade-off among the benefits of all stakeholders. The 
optimization problem can be reformulated in (9) where the min-
imization variable is y which is the amount of cleared power for 
each bid. The cleared power quantity should be positive and less 
than the maximum quantity of the bid (Eq. (10)).
Moreover, the optimization is subjected to (11) in which 
the sum of the cleared bids needs to be more than or equal 
to the required power by the quantity demanded by the DSO. 
The uncleared bids have a value equal to 0. Therefore, the 
sum of all cleared quantities will represent the quantity of 
the total cleared power.
(7) = a ⋅ R + b ⋅ A
(8)max
[
















The cleared reservation price for each aggregator is deter-
mined by a pay as bid concept. Furthermore, the cleared res-
ervation price must be checked to be less than or equal to the 
price of the DSO bid, while the activation price submitted by 
the aggregators should be checked that is not higher than the 
maximum allowable activation price of the DSO, even though 
the activation will be traded in the real-time market. This is 
because the submitted activation price of the aggregators will 
serve as the maximum price that they will be allowed to bid in 
the real-time market for the activation of the reserved flexibility.
4.2  Real‑time market
As mentioned before, in the real-time market only the acti-
vation of flexibility is traded. In the real-time market, each 
participant can submit a set of bids in order to make it possible 
to have a more realistic representation of their cost curves. 
Since the real-time markets are very close to the event, and the 
availability of the flexible resources might be limited due to 
being very close to the event, it is important to facilitate higher 
flexibility exploitation to reduce the damage from emergency 
events as much as possible. The idea is that a closer represen-
tation of the cost curve might help to increase the quantity of 
the cleared power in the market by avoiding the requirement 
to bid one single price for the whole available quantity. As the 
prices from the supply and demand bids show (see Fig. 8), the 
value of the first kWs is quite high for lowering the overload-
ing of the transformer, while the first few kWs of power from 
the batteries have lower cost for the supplier. Therefore, the 
possibility of a higher flexibility exploitation can be increased 
in this case. For example, in Fig. 3, an extreme case com-







Fig. 3  Example for single price bidding versus cost curve bidding
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bidding. As it can be seen in the single price bids, the sup-
plier and the demander can bid with their marginal price for 
flexibility which has resulted into no flexibility exploitation 
while bidding with multiple bids to represent the cost curve 
has resulted to the clearance of the market.
The participants are assumed to bid with their real costs 
and do not practice any manipulation in the market. In the 
current version of the proposed LFM the malicious behav-
ior of the aggregators and/or the DSO has not been stud-
ied. Hence, no mechanisms about the prevention of market 
power have been studied or proposed except for the basic 
rules about the confidentiality of some sensitive information 
(i.e., the type of issue in the DSO network, the volume of 
flexibility requested by the DSO, and the DSO pricing of the 
event) that are not disclosed until after the clearing of the 
market, as mentioned in Sect. 3.3. Furthermore, it can gener-
ally be assumed that the possibility of market manipulation 
decreases when the number of the participants increases and 
the geographical area covered by the LFM increases, facili-
tating its liquidity. However, since the prevention of market 
manipulation is important for the reliability and the accept-
ance of the LFM, the ways to avoid market power will be the 
scope of future study. In addition, the participants of which 
the reservation has been cleared in the long market are not 
allowed to bid higher than the activation price that they sub-
mitted in the long-term market. Similarly to the long-term 
market formulation, the time term and locational attributes 
are excluded from the mathematical representation. The bids 
from supplier s and demander d consist of a set of multiple 
bids {, q} (Eq. (14) and (15)).  is the price of the bid (SEK/
kW) and q is the quantity of the bid (kW). It is worth not-
ing that the suppliers of flexibility are the aggregators (or 
end users of electricity) and the demand for flexibility is 
requested by the system operators (i.e., DSOs in this case). 
The prices of the aggregators in the real-time market are 
bounded by their bids in the long-term market (Eq. (17)), 
while the total provided quantity should not be less than what 



























, d ∈ D, j ∈ d













,∀s ∈ S, s.t.yLT
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> 0
The size of each bid is limited to 0.1 kW to reach a closer 
representation of a continuous function for marginal values 
of flexibility or the cost function (Eq. (19)). This value to 
discretize the cost curve should originally reflect the size of 
the minimum flexibility supply that is possible to be pro-
vided by the flexibility technology as well as the minimum 
size of the bids allowed in the actual flexibility markets. In 
this study, the flexibility is supplied by battery resources 
which can be assumed to have a continuous operational 
power range and no limitation on the minimum quantity for 
supplying flexibility. The flexibility could also be provided 
by other resources, such as solar PVs, EVs, HPs and ven-
tilation systems, it has however not been considered in the 
simulations in this paper in order to keep the focus on the 
market framework, but it will be included in future versions 
of the proposed LFM. Therefore, the value is chosen small 
enough (0.1 kW) to provide an acceptable resolution of the 
cost curve while not causing high computational burden by 
high discretization of the cost curves.
Similarly to the long-term market, the real-time market is 
solved by maximizing the social welfare which is the sum of 
the value of the demand (i.e., consumers’ benefit) minus the 
sum of the value for the cleared supply bids (i.e., suppliers’ 
cost) (Eq. (20)). Similarly to the long-term market mode, 
in practical applications of such LFM structures, a trade-
off between the benefits of all stakeholders (i.e., the DSOs 
and the aggregators) should be considered. However, the 
proposed LFM has been built as closely as possible to strict 
market terms. In addition, the optimization of the social wel-
fare implies that there is a trade-off among the benefits of 
all the stakeholders. The maximization variable is y that is 
the amount of cleared power for each bid. The cleared value 
should be positive and less the than maximum provided 
quantity of the bid (Eq. (21) and (22)).
The total cleared quantity ( Y  ) for the supplier s and 
demand d is the sum of all the cleared capacities of its sub-
bids (Eqs. (23) and (24)).
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Finally, the cleared supply capacity must be equal to the 
total cleared demand capacity according to (25).
The cleared activation price is based on a pay as cleared 
concept which is equal to the maximum price among the 
cleared bids. The cleared bids are the bids that have a 
nonzero cleared quantities. Therefore, the cleared price, 
if there is an intersection between the demand and supply 
curves, will be calculated by:
In cases that there is no intersection between the demand 
and supply curves, but all the flexibility supply bids are 
below the flexibility demand bids, the real-time market will 
be cleared, as the DSO tries to procure as much flexibility 
as possible to address the emerging issue in its network. In 
such cases, the cleared price will be calculated as the average 
of the highest accepted supply bid and the lowest accepted 
demand bit, as described by (27):
5  Simulation results and discussions
The market model has been coded in Python. The simu-
lated test cases include both long-term and real-time ser-
vices exchange. Real data from two smart buildings on 
Chalmers campus (Gothenburg, Sweden) premises with 
different assets such as solar PVs, batteries, and HPs have 
been used for the formation of aggregator’s bids. Regarding 
the DSO bids, the simulations are based on fictitious data 
that are similar to the output data of a congestion fore-
casting mechanism [25]. In all simulated plots for both 
long-term and real-time services the price axis (y-axis) 
denotes the price of the flexibility exchange and not the 
total energy price. Therefore, the total resource reimburse-
ment should consider the possible energy exchange as well. 
For example, if the flexibility refers to the discharge of a 
storage unit (i.e., a battery) then, since the battery provides 
energy to the system along with the required flexibility, the 
resource should be paid for both deliveries. Thus, the total 
















max 𝜌i, min 𝜌j
]
∀𝜌i, 𝜌j ∈ B s.t. yi > 0, yj > 0
(27)
𝜌c =
max 𝜌i +min 𝜌j
2
∀𝜌i, 𝜌j ∈ B s.t. yi > 0, yj > 0
5.1  Long‑term market operation
For the simulations of the long-term market, it is considered 
that the aggregators bid their marginal cost and that the DSO 
is the only flexibility buyer. Hence, a single-sided auction is 
used to clear the market, where the DSO defines the volume 
and maximum acceptable price.
5.1.1  Studied long‑term service scenario
Figure 4 depicts a situation of overload in a given trans-
former on Chalmers campus one typical winter day, 
extracted by the mean values anticipated for a whole winter 
month (i.e., February), as the situation is expected to be 
generally more intense during winter due to heavier load. 
The transformer is expected to be overloaded between 
10:00–16:00. The dashed area represents the amount of 
flexibility that should be reserved by the DSO in the given 
location at the specific time period to address this conges-
tion. The flexibility that is traded (i.e., the given example 
of transformer overloading, but generally in any case) is 
a trade-off between overloading the transformer and pro-
curing flexibility to avoid the potential congestion. In the 
long-term market mode, not only the overloading, but also 
the reinforcement costs can be considered. However, in this 
paper, the focus is on illustrating the market clearing and 
the modelling of the DSOs’ bidding strategy is not investi-
gated. The trade-off is reflected in the pricing of the DSO’s 
bid and the required volume of the flexibility. More specifi-
cally in the long-term market mode, the trade-off is reflected 
in the maximum allowable price and the flexibility volume 
that is requested by the DSO in the respective bid. After 
the identification of the service, the DSO request is sent to 
Fig. 4  Example of long-term transformer overload
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the aggregators through the LFMO by opening a long-term 
orderbook, while the aggregators (i.e., the storage units), 
which are active in that specific area, bid in response to that 
request. When the time of the market closure is reached, the 
clearing procedure is initiated. The followed steps are:
1. The weighted prices for the bids of the DSO and the 
aggregators are calculated, based on the weighted factors 
provided by the DSO;
2. The bids of the aggregators are put in ascending order 
according to their weighted price;
3. It is checked if the total power of the bids is enough to 
satisfy the respective DSO request;
4. The weighted, activation and reservation prices that cor-
respond to the required DSO power volume are com-
pared with the respective maximum acceptable prices 
provided by the DSO.
If the requested flexibility volume can be catered by the 
aggregators’ bids, the market is cleared and the correspond-
ing reservation prices are determined in a pay as bid concept. 
When the required volume and/or the maximum accepta-
ble price is not satisfied, the market is not cleared, and the 
DSO should follow some alternative methods to mitigate 
the expected congestion, e.g., grid reinforcement or mobile 
energy storage.
5.1.2  Simulation results for long‑term market services
For the case depicted in Fig. 4, three different scenarios are 
illustrated, as shown in Fig. 5a-5c.
In the first case (Fig. 5a,) the market is not cleared due 
to high prices in aggregators’ bids. As it can be seen in 
Fig. 5a, the accumulated weighted price of the aggregators 
(red line) meets the DSO requested volume for flexibility 
(dashed blue line) at a larger price point than the DSO 
maximum weighted price (yellow dotted line). This means 
that the DSO pricing of the incident (i.e., the given trans-
former overloading), along with the DSO’s risk assessment 
of the event results in a lower price than the one available 
in the local flexibility market. Therefore, the market is not 
cleared, as it is more financially beneficial for the DSO to 
reinforce the system (i.e., by replacing the transformer) 
than to reserve the available flexibility. In the second case 
(Fig. 5b) the market is not cleared, as the available flex-
ibility of the aggregators is not enough to cover the volume 
requested by the DSO. As it can be seen in Fig. 5b, the 
accumulated weighted price of the aggregators (red line) 
does not meet the volume of the DSO request for flexibility 
(dashed blue line). This means that the available flexibil-
ity in the market is not enough to satisfy the respective 
DSO request. Therefore, the market is not cleared, and 
the DSO must reinforce the system (i.e., by replacing the 
transformer) to ensure stable future operation under the 
studied scenario. In the third case (Fig. 5c), the market is 
cleared, and some bids are accepted. As it can be seen in 
Fig. 5c, the accumulated weighted price of the aggrega-
tors (red line) meets the volume of the DSO request for 
flexibility (dashed blue line) at a point which is below 
Fig. 5  a Not cleared long-term market due to high flexibility price, 




the maximum DSO weighted price. Thus, the market is 
cleared, and the reservation price of each aggregator is 
determined with a pay as bid concept. The submitted acti-
vation price of each aggregator is stored to be fed in the 
real-time market to serve as the maximum price cap for 
the activation price of the aggregators.
5.2  Real‑time market operation
This studied scenario is about a real-time service need 
regarding a forecasted real-time overload in the same trans-
former as in the long-term service scenario. In the real-time 
market mode, the flexibility that is traded is a trade-off 
between overloading the transformer and procuring flex-
ibility to avoid the congestion. This trade-off is reflected in 
the pricing of the DSO’s bid and the required volume of the 
flexibility. In the real-time market, the trade-off is reflected 
in the price curve provided by the DSO in the respective 
bid. However, in this scenario no long-term or short-term 
capacities were cleared. In the real-time market, only the 
activation of flexibility is traded.
5.2.1  Real‑time studied scenario
The DSO provides a price curve for the flexibility that is 
required to address the given transformer overloading. The 
respective DSO price curves are produced based on the cal-
culation of overloading cost of a typical 250 MVA trans-
former (overheat, loss of life, degradation, etc.). To calcu-
late the demand curve, the loss of life of the transformer is 
calculated based on the IEEE C5791-2011Clause 7 [26]. 
Afterwards, in an iterative procedure, the loss of life is recal-
culated by reducing the overloading. The benefit from the 
flexibility is calculated by the reduction in transformer’s 
loss of life caused by the purchased flexibility. The DSO’s 
demand bid for the studied transformer overloading is pre-
sented in Fig. 6.
Four different aggregators are active in this area, which 
represent storage units located in the area. The price curves 
for the aggregators are calculated based on the storage units 
installed in two residential buildings located near Chal-
mers campus. The respective data that have been used to 
construct the flexibility supply bids can be found in [27]. 
The small amount of the available flexibility of the studied 
storage units, comparing to the large capacity of the trans-
former used for the definition of the DSO price curves, result 
in linear DSO price curves with low slope. However, the 
generality of the results and the adequacy of the proposed 
framework are not compromised. For the construction of 
the aggregated price curve the cheaper bids are prioritized 
over the more expensive ones. The cleared flexibility price 
and volume are defined by the intersection of the DSO 
price curve and the aggregated price curve of the bidding 
aggregators.
5.2.2  Simulation results for real‑time market services
Figure 7 depicts an example of a real-time overload of a 
transformer and the clearing of the market in three different 
timesteps. Three different cases can be defined in Fig. 7: a) 
Overload at timestep No.1. As can be seen in Fig. 7, there 
is a small overload at timestep 1. The market for the pro-
curement of flexibility to alleviate this congestion is cleared 
one timestep (i.e., 15 min) before the forecasted overload. 
Therefore, at timestep 0, the DSO requests flexibility by sub-
mitting a demand bid and the respective aggregators respond 
by submitting their bids. Figure 8a illustrates the described 
situation, where the DSO requests flexibility and the differ-
ent aggregators bid in response to that request. Since the 
anticipated overload at timestep 1 is not severe (0.04 pu), the 
aggregators bids and the demand bid from the DSO are inter-
secting at a low price/volume, resulting in partially cleared 
flexibility bids with low cleared price and volume (0.01SEK/
kW and 4 kW, respectively); b) Overload at timestep No.4. 
As the forecasted overload is increasing, the demand for 
flexibility increases i.e., at timestep 4 the forecasted over-
load has increased to about 1.2 pu. As previously, the market 
is cleared one time-step (i.e., 15 min) before the forecasted 
overload, i.e., at timestep 3. Hence, the DSO request and the 
respective aggregator bids are submitted at step 3. Figure 8b 
illustrates the described situation, where the DSO requests 
flexibility and the different aggregators bid in response to 
that request. Since the anticipated overload at timestep 4 
is more severe than the one at timestep 1, the demand and 
supply curves intersect at a higher price level compared 
to the previous case at timestep 1. As a result, the market 
is cleared, but the cleared price and the cleared flexibility 




Fig. 7  Real-time transformer overloading forecast and examples of real-time market clearing in different timesteps
volume are higher in this case (0.057 SEK/kW and 45 kW, 
respectively); c) Overload at timestep No.5. At timestep 
5, the forecasted overload has increased further, and the 
market is again cleared one timestep prior, i.e., at timestep 
4. Figure 8c illustrates the described situation, where the 
DSO requests flexibility and the different aggregators bid 
in response to that request. Since the anticipated overload 
at timestep 5 is more severe than in the previous cases, the 
price curve of the DSO is higher than in the previous cases. 
As a result, all the bids of the aggregators are accepted and 
the cleared flexibility price and volume is higher than both 
the previous cases (0.17 SEK/kW and 65 kW, respectively). 
It should be mentioned that in strict market rules this market 
should not be cleared as there is no intersection between the 
demand and the supply price curves. However, since flex-
ibility is traded in this market, the DSO can procure all the 
flexibility provided by the aggregators to alleviate the trans-
former overloading as much as possible. The cleared price 
was selected in the middle of the maximum of the supply 
price curve and the minimum of the demand price curve at 
the given volume as a trade-off between these price levels.
6  Conclusions
This paper presents the operation of a LFM for the holis-
tic management of distribution grids, through the trade of 
both reservation and activation of flexibility, indifferent 
of the type and the timeline of the required services. The 
framework and the initial model of the market have been 
explained, while the ability of the proposed market to trade 
both reservation and activation of flexibility in long-term 
and real-time horizons has been verified through simula-
tions. The modelling of the proposed short-term market will 
be the scope of future work. The proposed LFM framework 
provides DSOs with a market-based instrument to actively 
manage congestion and voltage issues in their networks. 
The different timelines provide solutions for DSOs to defer 
grid reinforcement in the long term, while allowing active 
management of the distribution grid in the short-term and 
real-time horizon. The suggested framework has been tested 
through long-term and real-time simulation-based test cases. 
The simulation of the operation of the short-term market 
mode will be the scope of future work. The outcome of the 
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Fig. 8  a Partially cleared real-time market for transformer overload-
ing with low cleared flexibility price and volume, b partially cleared 
real-time market for transformer overloading with higher cleared flex-
ibility price and volume, c partially cleared real-time market for trans-
former overloading with all aggregators’ bids accepted
Furthermore, the proposed market framework has been 
designed to be simple and fair, so that increased participation 
of aggregators is facilitated. The simplifications assumed 
in the current market model do not affect the generality 
of the extracted conclusions. The future developments of 
the proposed LFM include the modelling of the short-term 
market as well the simulations of both active and reactive 
power trade. In addition, the study of the rebound effect will 
be investigated. One way to mitigate the rebound effect is 
through market rules that clearly specify the duration and 
the maximum volume of the rebound for the resources, simi-
larly to [28]. Finally, different approaches for the long-term 
market clearing will be evaluated considering the possibility 
of three-dimensional clearing of reservation, activation and 
flexibility volume in the long term.
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